The action taken by President Perves Musharraf against the Islamist radicals holed up in Lal Masjid or 'the Red Mosque' in Islamabad, have been portrayed by some pundits as a heroic offensive against creeping Talibanization. This is largely a perception based upon wishful thinking. Musharraf is vulnerable at present and the last thing he wants to do is provoke a confrontation with religious fundamentalism. In deciding to act against the radicals of Lal Masjid, Musharraf was driven by a set of circumstances he could no longer ignore.

The Pakistani president is facing an opposition that is becoming increasingly united. His rule is being challenged in the courts. Popular opinion isn't on his side either, if the media is any indication of prevailing attitudes. Moreover there are elements in the establishment that are sympathetic to the Red Mosque militants.

When female vigilantes from the mosque were raiding massage parlors and video stalls, kidnapping and harassing those they accused of 'moral crimes', Musharraf did little to stem these Islamist excesses in the heart of the capital. Some of the more cynical suspect the reason he has been slow to act is because Jamia Hafsa, a madrassa associated with Lal Masjid, is alleged to have clandestine connections with the establishment. These cynics believe Jamia Hafsa is being used by partisans to whip up a distraction at a time when the government is under pressure with other challenges. It's hard to determine how much credence, if any, can be given to this conspiracy spin on the Islamabad drama.

So what were the factors that prompted Musharraf to act despite the risks?

International perceptions that he was caving in to militancy weren't helping his image, but this type of criticism of Musharraf has been going on for years without yielding any dramatic turnaround in his approach. In the present stand-off however he has been able to rely upon the cooperation of key religious elements that aren't supportive of the Lal Masjid militants. For example the central board of madrassahs in Pakistan - Wafaq-ul-Madaris - took the unusual step of suspending Jamia Hafsa's membership. Also the Islamic contingent in the Pakistani legislature came out strongly against the militants. Developments such as these made the move on the mosque less of a risk for Musharraf.

However there is another reason why the President chose to send in the Rangers. The Chinese have been extremely unhappy that their nationals are being targeted by Islamist radicals in Pakistan. Back on June 23, 2007, female vigilantes from Jamia Farida and Jamia Hafsa forced their way into a massage parlor in Islamabad. The workers they abducted from the establishment, included seven Chinese nationals. Although the Chinese workers were released the next day, the clerics of Lal Masjid railed loudly against corruption and warned that Chinese nationals would not be given a free pass.

Complaints from China ensued, delivered by Zhou Yongkang Zhou, the Chinese Minister for Public Security. He referred explicitly to Lal Masjid radicals as "terrorists" and demanded that Pakistan act more forcefully to protect Chinese nationals working in the country. This was far from the first time that China has issued such appeals to Pakistan.

Musharraf has for some time been handicapped in what he can reasonably accomplish on the security front without the risk of alienating segments of the population he badly needs to keep on-side - or at least in a condition of sullen inaction. The impotence of Musharraf is clearly demonstrated by his inability to act more forcefully against Al Qaeda in the tribal areas. His impotence has also extended to an inability to intervene effectively in cases that involved assaults on Chinese nationals. For example Waziristan warlord, Abdullah Mehsud, was responsible for ordering the abductions of Chinese engineers. No amount of pressure from China in cases such as this is likely to produce overnight results for the simple reason that in parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) the prestige and popularity of tribal leaders such as Mehsud eclipses that of Musharraf.

Adding to the political tensions generated by this spate of kidnappings and assaults, is the appalling record of China in the Western Xinjiang region, where about half of the population is Muslim Uighur. Under the pretext of rooting out terrorists, the Chinese have basically been engaging in systemic repression, a tactic that Human Rights Watch describes as "a matter of state policy".

Needless to say the ruthless tactics used in Western Xinjiang have made Pakistani Islamists more sympathetic to the plight of the Uighurs. In turn, the Chinese claim that Uighur 'terrorists' have taken refuge in Pakistan, and are present in FATA, where they have targeted Chinese workers. The Chinese also made the allegation that the attack on the Islamabad massage parlor workers was partly engineered by Uighur students who were present in Lal Masjid. Beijing also suggested that Uighur activists could pose a security threat to next year's Olympics, which is being hosted by China.

The pressure on Musharraf to act from a number of sources was considerable. What is disturbing though, is that it required these kinds of pressures to get the President to take on the radicals in the very capital of the country. His reluctance is even more surprising when you consider what the militants have been up to. According to relatives, many of the young women inside the mosque are being held against their will. The stated aim of the leader, Maulana Abdul Aziz, was no less than the introduction of sharia law across-the-board in an effort to 'Islamize' the capital. The militants have been engaging in vigilante-style kidnappings, assaults and the burning of property - for example pornographic and media-related materials stolen from vendors. They also instituted a sort of Islamist kangaroo court in the mosque - more symbolic than anything else - as a way of demonstrating their fidelity to sharia law.

If this affair can be brought to a successful conclusion without excessive loss of life, it will likely strengthen Musharraf's position in the short term. However it may also raise the expectations of his allies. They may deduce that if he can take on a mosque complex in Islamabad, he should be able to act more forcefully elsewhere. What this thinking overlooks is that Islamabad is friendly turf compared to the hostility that exists toward the government in some of the tribal regions. On the other hand if the siege ends with major loss of life, the defenders could well be viewed as martyrs, even by those Pakistani Muslims who failed to offer their support. Tensions are high as it is, with an effort on Friday to shoot down Musharraf's plane as it was taking off from the military airport in Islamabad.

Elections are coming up in Pakistan later this year. It will be difficult for Musharraf to maintain broad-based control given the increasing opposition he is facing. He has publicly discussed remaining as President while relinquishing the dominant role he has had with the military. This could prove to be a risky move, but probably a risk worth taking. Most of all at this juncture, he needs greater legitimacy, or at least the perception of it.

About the Author

Aidan Maconachy is a freelance writer and artist based in Ontario. You can visit his blog at http://aidanmaconachyblog.blogspot.com/